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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS 
ASSOCIATION, a 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
case No. 14635 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
As pointed out in the Stipulation of Facts (Tr. 
pages 88-124) , this is a civil action brought by plaintiff-
respondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter 
"Union Pacific"), seeking indemnification from defendant-
appellant, Intermountain Farmers Association (hereinafter 
"Intermountain Farmers"), under one or more of the following 
theories (Tr. page 97): 
1. Full indemnity under either contractual indem-
nity and/or implied indemnity; 
2. contribution under Section 78-27-39, U.C.A. 
1953 (Supp. 1973); 
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3. Application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. 
Union Pacific accepts Intermountain Farmers' "DISPO-
SITION IN LOWER COURT" and "RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL", but 
its "STATEMENT OF FACTS" is not complete. Therefore, Union 
Pacific submits the following supplemental "STATEMENT OF 
FACTS". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As defendant states, this case was submitted to the 
trial court on stipulated facts. A copy of that stipulation, 
without exhibits, is attached hereto for the court's conven-
ient reference. 
Defendant's "STATEMENT OF FACTS" is deficient 
because it omits several pertinent portions of both the agree-
ment between Union Pacific and Intermountain Farmers and the 
judgment rendered by Judge Sawaya. A complete statement of 
the pertinent contractual provisions is as follows (Tr. 
pages 7-8) : 
Section 1. The Lessor, for and in 
consideration of the covenants and pay-
ments hereinafter mentioned to be per-
formed and made by the Lessee, hereby 
agrees to lease and let and does hereby 
lease and let unto the Lessee .... 
Section 5. It is especially cove-
nanted and agreed . . . that the Lessee 
shall at all times protect the Lessor 
and the leased premises from all injury, 
-2-
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damage or loss by reason of the occu-
pation of the leased premises by the 
Lessee, or from any cause whatsoever 
growing out of said Lessee's use thereof. 
Section 8. No building, platform 
or other structure shall be erected or 
maintained and no material or obstruction 
of any kind or character shall be placed, 
piled, stored, stacked or maintained 
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) inches 
to the center line of the nearest track 
of the Lessor; . 
Section 11. The Lessee shall be 
liable for any and all injury or damage 
to persons or property, of whatsoever 
nature or kind, arising out of or con-
tributed to by any breach in whole or 
in part of any covenant of this agree-
ment. [Emphasis added.] 
A complete statement of the pertinent provisions of 
Judge Sawaya's Conclusions of Law is as follows (Tr. page 155): 
1. The written Lease Agreement 
between plaintiff and defendant requires 
defendant to indemnify plaintiff for any 
and all injuries that were sustained by 
Richard V. Richins, an employee of the 
plaintiff, on October 31, 1972, while per-
forming his employment duties on railroad 
trackage immediately adjacent to the prem-
ises covered by the subject Lease. 
2. The Court further concludes that 
the negligence of either party is not an 
issue nor a necessary element to the con-
clusion of this action. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $165,632.50, 
together with interest at 6% per annum pur-
suant to Section 15-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, from 
and after October 31, 1973, to date hereof, 
and together with costs and disbursements 
herein incurred in the amount of $25.20. 
-3-
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POINT I 
THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY MR. RICHINS ON 
OCTOBER 31, 1972, WERE NOT CAUSED, IN WHOLE 
OR IN PART, BY ANY NEGLIGENCE OF UNION PACIFIC. 
On page 22 of its brief, Intermountain Farmers con-
tends that Union Pacific's brakeman, Levi Ki Tua'one, negli-
gently failed to maintain a proper lookout during the west-
bound train movement along the Poultry Track adjacent to 
Intermountain Farmers' facility. Intermountain Farmers fails 
to point out, however, that there was fresh snow on the ground 
at the time (Stipulation, • 7); that it was dark (Stipulation, 
11 7); and that although Mr. Tua'one was maintaining a lookout 
he did not observe any obstacle to the movement of the train 
(Stipulation, • 16). 
In this regard, Mr. Tua'one testified that as the 
train proceeded in a westbound direction onto the spur track 
serving Intermountain Farmers "everything was covered with 
snow" (Deposition page 7, line 17; see also deposition page 
6, lines 22-23). The photographs attached to the Stipula-
tion of Facts as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", and "I" 
which were secured the morning following Mr. Richins' acci-
dent reasonably depict the conditions prevailing at the time 
of the accident. Mr. Tua'one also testified that he did not 
see the spool of cable prior to the accident (Deposition page 
-4-
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9, lines 13-15) and in retrospect believes that this was 
solely due to the snow (Deposition page 9, lines 23-25; page 
10, lines 2-6; page 32, lines 22-25; page 33, lines 1-3). 
In short, there is no factual basis whatsoever to 
even infer that Mr. Tua'one or Union Pacific was negligent 
or that either failed to act in a reasonable and prudent 
manner under all of the circumstances. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, UNION PACIFIC HAD BEEN 
NEGLIGENT, WHICH NEGLIGENCE UNION PACIFIC 
EXPRESSLY DENIES, SUCH NEGLIGENCE WOULD BE 
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
A. Applicable sections of the agreement between 
Intermountain Farmers and Union Pacific make the question of 
negligence irrelevant. 
Section 11 of the agreement between Intermountain. 
Farmers and Union Pacific requires Intermountain Farmers to 
indemnify Union Pacific for any injuries to persons "arising 
out of or contributed to by any breach in whole or in part" 
of any covenant of the subject agreement, and Section 8 of 
the agreement prohibits the placement or maintenance of any 
material or obstruction within eight feet six inches of the 
center line of the track on which Richins' accident occurred. 
-5-
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It is undisputed that at the time Mr. Richins sustained his 
1 
injury, the spool of cable which his foot hit was located 
within the proscribed clearance zone (Stipulation, ,, 26). 
Consequently, it is clear that the provisions of Section 8 
of the agreement were breached by the mere existence of the 
spool of cable within the proscribed clearance zone and that 
Union Pacific is entitled to full indemnity in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 11 of the agreement. 
Furthermore, it is also clear that Intermountain 
Farmers owned the spool of cable (Stipulation, ,,,, 5, 25, and 
28) and maintained it upon the leased premises (Stipulation, 
,, 29). Consequently, it is clear that Mr. Richins' injuries 
were sustained as a direct result of Intermountain Farmers' 
use and occupation of the leased premises, thus providing 
Union Pacific with a second independent basis for contractual 
indemnification under the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 of 
the agreement. 
1 
See the following excerpt from page 18 of Intermoun-
tain Farmers' brief on appeal 
As the train commenced moving out of 
the yard, a portion of the engine 
apparently again passed near the spool 
where the leg of the conductor, Richins, 
evidently, in some manner, came in con-
tact with the spool, causing him to 
fall to the ground resulting in severe 
injuries to his right leg. 
and the first full paragraph of page 4 of defendant's Trial 
Memorandum (Tr. page 72). 
-6-
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B. Under applicable case law the question of negli-
gence is irrelevant. 
In Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., ST. P. & 
P. R. Co., 199 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1952), the railroad sought 
contractual indemnity, under clauses similar to those in 
issue here, from an industry in a situation where one of the 
industry's employees had been injured when a train struck a 
metal box located within the proscribed minimum clearance 
requirements of the industry track contract. The court, in 
holding that the railroad was entitled to recover full indem-
nity from the industry, ruled (1) that the railroad, in 
making the contract covering property located on its right 
of way, acted in a private capacity and not as a common carrier 
and, consequently, could exact its own conditions as to occu-
pancy; (2) that the industry's obligation to keep the tracks 
unobstructed was absolute and unqualified; (3) that the 
industry's liability doesn't depend upon negligence or tort 
but that such liability arises from breach of contract; and 
(4) that the industry could have made negligence a condition 
of liability but since it didn't it would not be heard to 
complain of the choice it made. With particular application 
to the present case is the statement of the court at page 731: 
The Railroad Company's cause of action 
against the Moline Company, however, is 
not primarily based upon tort, nor is 
it dependent upon negligence. The lia-
bility of the Moline Company arises from 
-7-
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its breach of this indemnity provision 
of the contract. The rule as to proxi-
mate cause is not available to the 
Moline Company because by its contract 
it agreed to indemnify against loss 
"from and against any and all damages, 
remote as well as proximate, in any 
wise resulting from any non-performance 
or non-observance of the foregoing 
covenant concerning lateral distance 
or perpendicular height, for which the 
Railway Company shall become, in whole 
or in part, liable or be charged." 
The jury, in answer to an interrogatory 
proposed by appellant, found that 
plaintiff's injuries resulted in whole 
or in part from "the presence of the 
trash box within six feet laterally at 
right angles from the nearer rail of 
track 4." It thus appears that the 
damages from which the appellant 
agreed to hold the Railroad Company 
harmless need not have been caused 
solely by any negligence on its part, 
nor was the act of the Moline Company 
required to be the proximate cause of 
the loss. A liability resulted even 
though such act were the remote cause. 
The case of John P. Gorman Coal 
Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 Ky. 
551, 281 s.w. 487, is strikingly similar 
in its facts to the case at bar. In 
that case the Coal Company agreed to 
maintain and keep the tracks free from 
obstructions and to hold the Railroad 
harmless on account of any loss arising 
from a violation of the provision. In 
the course of the opinion it is said: 
"The obligation to keep the 
tracks free from obstruction, and 
to hold the appellee harmless from 
any claims on account of any fail-
ure on appellant's part to so keep 
the tracks, is an absolute one. 
Appellant might have made it a 
condition of liability that it should 
be guilty of some negligence, but 
-8-
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this it did not do. It was 
free to make any contract it 
chose so long as it was not 
against public policy, and, 
having chosen to undertake an 
absolute liability rather than 
a qualified one, it cannot now 
be heard to complain of the 
choice it made." [Emphasis 
added.] 
In Northern P. Ry. co. v. National Cylinder G. Div. 
of C.C., 467 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1970), the railroad was awarded 
full contractual indemnity from a rail welding contractor for 
injuries sustained by a railroad employee whose leg was 
crushed by a moving rail. The court took special note of the 
fact that the agreement was silent on the question of whether 
the negligence of either party was relevant to the obligation 
of the industry to indemnify the railroad and concluded that 
causation rather than negligence controlled. In this regard, 
the court states at pages 887-88: 
The trial court conunented in its 
oral opinion it was significant the 
agreement at no point mentioned the 
word "negligent" or any concept of 
fault. It noted the language used con-
cerned itself solely with the occurrence 
of an incident which would later give 
rise to a claim or lawsuit .... 
The trial court concluded the 
agreement was a clear undertaking 
based upon causation rather than 
negligence or fault and had the inten-
tion of the parties been otherwise, 
they could clearly and simply have pro-
vided in the agreement that the obli-
gation to indemnify would be subject 
to fault on the part of National in 
-9-
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connection with some phase of the 
welding operation. • 
National argues that inasmuch 
as the trial court did not find 
negligence on its part, it cannot 
be required to indemnify Northern 
Pacific. Under the terms of the 
indemnity provision of the contract, 
the trial court's finding that 
National's activities caused the 
injuries out of which the claim arose 
is sufficient to establish liability. 
See also Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Anthony, 199 F.Supp, 
286 (W.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied 375 U.S. 830 (1963). 
In Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Rental Storage & T. 
Co., 524 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1975), the railroad company sought 
contractual indemnity from an industry pursuant to the pro-
visions of a spur track agreement for $63,500, which it had 
paid to an employee's widow under the provisions of the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. During a switching movement 
over this spur, the widow's decedent had been caught and 
crushed to death between a boxcar and a loading dock. The 
contract, in relevant part, required the industry to indemnify 
the railroad for any liability, claims or losses which were 
"in any manner caused by, arising out of or connected with" 
its covenant to maintain proper, horizontal clearances 
between the center line of the spur track and any buildings, 
structures, fixtures, materials or obstructions. 524 S.W.2d 
-10-
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at 902. The trial court awarded judgment to the railroad 
and the industry appealed, claiming that the railroad had 
failed to establish that the railroad's liability accrued 
as a direct and proximate cause of the industry's breach of 
the close clearance covenant. In this regard, there was 
evidence that the industry's lessee may have been the party 
directly responsible for the close clearance impairment. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals first expressly rejected any 
suggestion that common law tort concepts of proximate cause 
were applicable, 524 S.W.2d at 910, and then held that the 
"arising out of or connected with" language of the contract 
controlled. 524 S.W.2d at 909-10. 
It is significant to note that the provisions of 
Sections 1, 5, 8, and 11 of the agreement between Intermoun-
tain Farmers and Union Pacific do not mention the concept 
of negligence and/or fault. Section 11 provides that Inter-
mountain Farmers shall be liable for any and all injury to 
any person "arising out of or contributed to by any breach 
in whole or in part of any covenant of this agreement". 
This language is completely free from any ambiguity and is 
as absolute in its terms as is the language in Section 8 
wherein Intermountain Farmers covenanted not to place, pile, 
store, stack or maintain any material or obstruction of any 
kind or character closer than eight feet six inches to the 
center line of the nearest Union Pacific track. Based upon 
-11-
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this language and the authorities discussed above, Union 
Pacific clearly is entitled to full indemnification from 
Intermountain Farmers. 
c. Even if Union Pacific were negligent in the 
manner claimed by Intermountain Farmers, which negligence 
Union Pacific expressly denies, such negligence would not 
be sufficient to bar Union Pacific's recovery. 
As in the instant case, the industry in Missouri 
Pacific, supra, also claimed that the railroad was not entitled 
to indemnification under the contract because it was guilty 
of contributory negligence. The industry phrased this con-
tention in terms of "knowing acquiescence" by the switch 
crew,of which the widow's decedent was a member, in continuing 
operations in the face of the open and obvious hazard pre-
sented by the material which was stacked in violation of the 
close clearance covenant in the contract. The court rejected 
this defense on several grounds. First, it noted that the 
defense is strictly limited when the right to indemnity 
arises ex contractu as was the situation in the case before 
it. The court went on, however, to analyze this defense as 
if plaintiff's action was premised on implied rather than 
contractual indemnity. The court noted that essentially two 
elements are necessary in order for the defense to be success-
fully asserted. First, it must be established that the rail-
-12-
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road had long, continued awareness of the dangerous condition 
and had completely failed to take any corrective action or 
to request the industry to do so. Secondly, it must also 
be established that the railroad's conduct was so seriously 
wrong that it would be inequitable to order full restitution. 
The court then stated that "Something more than imputed legal 
knowledge of a temporary, though dangerous condition is 
required, and that is all the evidence suggests here." 524 
S.W.2d at 911. 
In the instant case, the record indicates that the 
spool of cable had not been observed in the vicinity of the 
track on the day prior to Richins' accident (Stipulation, • 
29); that Richins' accident occurred at night under poor 
lighting conditions (Stipulation, ,, 7); and that the area 
in question was covered with fresh snow (Stipulation, ,, 7). 
Consequently, even if Intermountain Farmers' argument that 
Union Pacific is barred from seeking indemnity because of 
Mr. Tua'one's failure to detect the spool of cable in time 
to prevent Mr. Richins' injury was relevant in the face of 
the contractual provisions involved here, it is clear from 
the foregoing that such evidence would not be sufficient to 
bar Union Pacific's action for indemnity. 
Based upon the foregoing, Union Pacific is clearly 
entitled, under the facts in this case, to recover full 
indemnity from Intermountain Farmers. 
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POINT III 
UNION PACIFIC IS NOT SEEKING RECOVERY FOR 
ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE IN THIS ACTION BUT, 
RATHER, IS SEEKING RECOVERY FOR LIABILITY 
WHICH WAS VICARIOUSLY IMPOSED UPON IT BY 
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT FOR 
THE BREACH OF A CONTRACTUAL DUTY OWED IT 
BY INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS. 
Under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, 45 u.s.c.A. § 51, et ~· a railroad has a non-
delegable duty to furnish its employees with a safe place in 
which to work, regardless of whether or not it has actual 
2 
control over the premises upon which the injury occurred. 
A railroad is liable under this Act for injuries to its 
employees which are caused, in whole or in part, by any 
negligence, no matter how slight, upon the part of the rail-
road or the injured employee's co-workers. Rogers v. Missouri 
Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1956). A railroad is pre-
eluded from delegating its responsibilities under the Act 
to a third party; however, it can indemnify itself through 
a contract such that a third party may be required to satisfy 
2 
For an excellent discussion of this point in a 
case quite similar to the one at bar, see Missouri Pacific 
R. Co. v. Rental Storage & T. Co., supra. 
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the railroad's statutory obligation by compensating the injured 
employee for his injury. Scherff v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
Railroad Co., 449 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1971); Beachboard v. 
Southern Railway Company, 193 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1972); Inland 
Container Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 266 F.2d 857 
(5th Cir. 1959) . 
Even though the subject agreement does not mention 
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Inter-
mountain Farmers is still held to have known of the existence 
of this federal statute at the time it executed the subject 
agreement. Oregon Short Line R. co. v. Idaho Stockyards co., 
12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826 (1961); Southern Pacific Trans-
portation Co. v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Furthermore, a railroad may be guilty of passive negligence 
and therefore liable to its employee under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act and still recover full indemnity from the 
industry. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Anthony, supra; 
Booth-Kelly Lumber co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 183 F.2d 902 
(9th Cir. 1950). See also Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Rental 
Storage and T. Co., supra. 
In the Anthony case, supra, the railroad sought con-
tractual indemnity from a shipper under a spur track agree-
ment for the amount paid by the railroad to one of its 
employees under the provisions of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act for injuries which he had sustained when he 
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struck the overhang of a moveable shed which had been placed 
in close proximity to the spur track in violation of the 
close clearance provision of the spur track agreement. The 
court, in holding that the railroad was entitled to full 
indemnity, stated on pages 298-99: 
The railway company can be guilty 
of passive negligence and therefore 
liable to the claimant under its non-
delegable duties as set forth in the 
F.E.L.A. and still recover full indem-
nity from the industry. (Citations 
omitted) 
The question of liability of the 
industry in such cases is to be deter-
mined from the indemnity contract and 
the parties' negligence is to be deter-
mined on the basis of the F.E.L.A., 45 
u.s.c.A. § 51 et seq., not common law 
negligence. (Citations omitted) 
This is a case, then, in which the 
defendant industry was actively negli-
gent in creating and not correcting the 
unsafe condition adjoining the spur 
track which caused the accident, while 
the plaintiff's only negligence consisted 
of the defendants' negligence vicariously 
imputed to it by virtue of its nondele-
gable duty to its employee, •.. to pro-
vide him with a safe place to work. 
Accord, Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Alpha Portland Cement co., 
218 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1955). 
In the landmark Booth-Kelly case, supra, the rail-
road sought contractual indemnity from the industry for the 
full amount paid to an employee under the provisions of the 
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Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained by 
the employee when he struck a wood cart left by the 
industry within 42 inches of the nearest rail. The trial 
court awarded the railroad only one-half of the claimed 
amount and both parties appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals remanded the case with directions to award the 
railroad full indemnity under the spur track agreement. 
The court differentiated between "active" and "passive" 
negligence, concluding that the industry was actively negli-
gent in placing and leaving the cart within 42 inches from 
the track and that the railroad was passively negligent 
because of its failure "to make safe a dangerous condition 
of land or chattels, which was created by the misconduct 
of another, i.e., of Booth-Kelly." 183 F.2d at 911. The 
court further remarked that "Southern Pacific seeks indem-
nity not for its own negligence, but rather for that of 
Booth-Kelly." Id. at 912. In discussing Southern Pacific's 
negligence, the court stated: 
Basic in any determination of the 
meaning of this whole paragraph is an 
understanding that when the parties con-
templated that there might be claims 
for indemnity they must have been cog-
nizant of the fact that in the ordinary 
case the occasion for seeking indemnity 
would not arise unless the indemnitee 
had himself been found guilty of some 
fault, for otherwise no judgment could 
have been recovered from him. That this 
is typically true is recognized in the 
comment under Section 95, Restatement 
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on Restitution, as follows: "In all of 
these situations the payer is not barred 
by the fact that he was negligent in 
failing to discover or to remedy the 
defect as a result of which the harm was 
occasioned; in most of the cases it is 
because of this failure that he is liable 
.. 183 F.2d at 907. 
The Utah courts have recognized this distinction 
between "active" and "passive" negligence in a number of 
different cases. Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 
159 P.2d 149 (1945); Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 
27 Utah 2d 109, 493 P.2d 625 (1972); and Barr v. Brezina 
Construction Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 
409 U.S. 1125 (1973). 
In Gollick v. New York Central Railroad Company, 
138 F.Supp. 384 (E.D. Mich. 1956), the railroad sought con-
tractual indemnity from the industry for the amount which it 
had paid to an employee pursuant to the provisions of the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. The railroad company 
employee was knocked off the side of a boxcar upon which he 
was riding when his body contacted a steel "I" beam located 
perpendicularly between two sets of tracks running into the 
industry's plant. The "I" beam was a part of the brace for 
a special door installed by the industry. When the door 
was opened it was necessary to separately remove the "I" 
beam and slide it to the side so that there would be suffi-
cient clearance for railroad switching operations. This 
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accident happened at night after the industry employees had 
left the plant. The court concluded from the evidence that 
the door in question was opened by railroad employees who 
failed to remove the "I" beam. Even though the specific 
contractual indemnification language in question did not 
provide for the railroad to be indemnified for its own negli-
gence, the court held that the railroad was entitled to full 
indemnification in the following language: 
We pass to the question of whether 
or not the contract intended to include 
indemnity of the Railroad Company where 
the accident was caused in part by 
negligence of its own employees. Para-
graph Third of the indemnity contract, 
after providing that the Industry shall 
not place nor allow any temporary or 
permanent structure or obstruction 
within six feet laterally of the tracks 
then said: 
"The industry shall indemnify, 
and hold harmless, the Railroad 
Company from any and all liability 
for loss of life or damage or injury 
to property or persons (including 
employees and property of either of 
the parties hereto) , arising by reason 
of, or which in any way results 
from, the existence or maintenance 
of structures or obstructions at 
clearances less than standard (six 
feet) * * * n • • • 
The Industry "maintained" the "I" beam 
and in view of the language above quoted 
it is clear that the intent of the parties 
was that if the obstruction in any way 
contributed to the injury, the Industry 
was to indemnify the Railroad Company 
therefor without regard to the latter's 
negligence .... 
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In the case at bar Gollick's injuries, 
regardless of whether they were con-
tributed to by the train crew's failure 
to remove the "I" beam, were also caused 
by the Industry's negligent violation 
of its contract, to-wit: maintenance of 
a structure closer than six feet laterally 
to the tracks. Under the contract it was 
the Industry's duty to see that the "I" 
beam was removed. Having failed to do so 
renders the Industry liable. 138 F.Supp. 
at 387-88. 
Union Pacific's liability to Mr. Richins arose 
solely by virtue of its nondelegable duty under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, et~ (Stipu-
lation, tt 33, 39, and 40), to provide him with a safe place 
in which to work. The property where the accident occurred 
was under the complete control of Intermountain Farmers. 
The spool of cable was owned and maintained on the property 
by Intermountain Farmers. Clearly, the accident occurred 
because Intermountain Farmers failed to comply with the close 
clearance covenant in the agreement. It is this failure on 
Interrnountain Farmers' part for which Union Pacific was 
vicariously liable to Mr. Richins under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. Therefore, Union Pacific's negligence, if 
any, under the circumstances, was at most passive or. deriva-
tive in character. Consequently, Union Pacific is entitled 
to recover full indemnification from Intermountain Farmers. 
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POINT IV 
THE CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED BY INTER-
MOUNTAIN FARMERS IN ITS BRIEF ARE NOT IN 
POINT AND ARE NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE LEGAL 
AND/OR FACTUAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS 
CASE. 
Intermountain Farmers' brief relies extensively 
on this court's decision in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965). 
In that case, the railroad sought indemnity under the pro-
visions of an agreement providing for the construction and 
maintenance of a pipeline for damages paid to an El Paso 
employee who sustained personal injuries in an accident 
which occurred at a railroad crossing located one and one-half 
miles from the pipeline covered by the subject agreement. 
The railroad admitted that it was negligent but sought 
indemnity under a general indemnity clause, arguing that 
"but for" the existence of the pipeline to which the El Paso 
employee was traveling at the time he sustained injury the 
railroad crossing accident would not have occurred. This 
court rejected this "but for" argument in the following 
language: 
The fair import of the entire provision, 
considered together in context as it 
should be, is that the damages guaranteed 
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against should have at least some 
causal connection with the construction, 
existence, maintenance or operation of 
the pipeline other than an incident 
which happened merely coincidental to 
its existence. 408 P.2d at 914. 
The court concluded that the occurrence of the crossing acci-
dent was an unforeseen and unrelated event which was not 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
pipeline agreement was executed. Clearly, this was not 
the situation in the case at bar. 
Intermountain Farmers also cites the Utah cases 
of Jankele v. Texas, 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936); Walker 
Bank & Trust co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 
P.2d 944 (1959); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 
P.2d 207 (1965); and Howe Rents Corporation v. Worthen, 18 
Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966), in support of its position 
on appeal, none of which is relevant to the facts or legal 
issues in this case. 
In the Jankele case, supra, the plaintiffs entered 
into an agreement with the defendant oil company for the 
installation by the oil company of certain gasoline pumps 
and tanks on property owned by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
further agreed to purchase the oil and gas which they intended 
to sell to the public at this location from the defendant. 
The defendant negligently installed one of the tanks such 
that a joint on the line leading from the tank to the pump 
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could not withstand normal settling of the tank and ruptured. 
During a period of approximately four months, over 3,000 
gallons of gasoline with a value of $615 were lost through 
this ruptured joint. The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
the value of this gasoline pursuant to the agreement between 
the parties which contained the following language: 
The dealer shall * * * at his expense 
keep said equipment in good order and 
repair; * * * exonerate the company 
and hold it harmless from all claims, 
suits and liabilities of every char-
acter whatsoever and howsoever arising 
from the existence or use of said equip-
ment. 54 P.2d at 426. 
The defendant asserted this clause as a complete defense to 
the plaintiff's claims. The trial court entered judgment 
for the plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed. 
The crux of the matter in the court's view was whether or 
not the quoted language exempted the defendant from liability 
for negligent installation of the equipment. The court deter-
mined that the foregoing language manifestly did not on its 
face exempt the defendant from such liability. The court 
admittedly indicated that there was some question as to 
whether or not the defendant could relieve itself by con-
tract from its own negligence, but it did not squarely address 
the issue other than to indicate that there were situations 
where a party could do so. The court felt that it was not 
necessary to decide this question because the contract only 
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sought to exonerate the defendant for liabilities "arising 
from the existence or use of said equipment" and not from 
liabilities incurred in instal.ling the equipment. 
In the instant case, the contract clearly covers 
the liability over which Union Pacific brought suit. In 
addition, there is no evidence of negligence on Union Pacific's 
part. Even assuming that Mr. Tua'one's conduct was negligent, 
which negligence Union Pacific expressly denies, such negli-
gence could not be construed to be more than passive in 
nature and this could not serve to bar Union Pacific's 
action for indemnification. 
In the Walker Bank case, supra, the defendant's 
predecessor in interest, Commercial Bank, had failed to pay 
the premiums on a life insurance policy upon the life of one 
Nancy Galligher in accordance with an authorization furnished 
by her. Walker Bank, as the guardian of her children, 
sought and recovered a judgment from the defendant in the 
amount of the insurance policy. The decedent had signed a 
"sight draft authorization" which authorized the Commercial 
Bank to charge her account on a monthly basis with the drafts 
which were to be drawn by her insurance company. At some 
point in time the bank lost the authorization and started 
to return the monthly sight drafts to the insurance company 
with a notation "not authorized"; however, the bank never 
notified the decedent of this action. The authorization 
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which the decedent signed also contained an indemnification 
clause which required the decedent to hold the bank harmless 
for any liability resulting from its compliance with the 
authorization. This court in affirming the trial court's 
award of judgment to the plaintiff stated that this language 
purports only to protect the bank from 
liability arising from its compliance 
with the authorization, ..• It is 
likewise not unreasonable to assume that 
what the bank was being protected for 
was a debiting of the account for the 
amount drawn; and that the drawer of the 
drafts might draw for too much money, or 
too many drafts, or that some other such 
mistake might occur for which it did not 
want to be responsible. But there is no 
provision that it would be protected in 
the event of entire failure to fulfill 
the arrangement. 341 P.2d at 947. 
Clearly, if the court had not interpreted the clause in this 
fashion there would have been a complete failure of consid-
eration for the agreement between the decedent and the 
bank. Obviously, the decedent had to keep money on account 
with the bank in order for the authorization to be honored. 
On the other hand, the fact that the bank offered this ser-
vice undoubtedly acted as an inducement to the decedent to 
keep her funds on account with the bank. If the bank could, 
at any time, arbitrarily and unilaterally cease paying the 
insurance premiums without notifying the depositor of this 
action, the agreement signed by the decedent would have no 
value whatsoever. 
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In the instant case, Union Pacific leased certain 
land to Intermountain Farmers. Although Intermountain Farmers 
thereby acquired complete control and dominion over the 
leased premises, Union Pacific employees were still required 
to work on or about said premises. As partial consideration 
for the execution of this agreement, Intermountain Farmers 
expressly and explicitly agreed to keep an area eight feet 
six inches on either side of the center line of this track 
clear of any obstructions or obstacles of any kind or nature 
whatsoever. Further, Interrnountain Farmers agreed to assume 
complete liability for any injury to any person as a result 
of its failure to keep this area free of obstructions. Inter-
mountain Farmers did not keep the area free from obstructions 
and Mr. Richins was seriously injured as a direct consequence 
thereof. Clearly, his injury resulted as a direct and proxi-
mate cause of Intermountain Farmers' failure to comply with 
the affirmative action requirements of the close clearance 
covenant. If Intermountain Farmers is not held responsible 
for the injury to Mr. Richins, a significant failure of con-
sideration would result and the clear intent of the parties 
would be abrogated. 
In the Barrus case, supra, an employee of an insur-
ance company which had leased a portion of a building for 
office space slipped and fell in a common hallway in that 
building. She sued the landlords for damages and they, in 
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turn, impleaded the insurance company, seeking indemnification 
under the terms of an indemnification clause contained in the 
lease. This clause provided in relevant part that the land-
lords would be liable to the employees of the tenant insurance 
company for any injuries inflicted upon them as a result of 
the negligence of the landlords. The insurance company, on 
the other hand, agreed to indemnify the landlords for any 
damage or liability resulting to the landlords from the 
injury to any person which was caused by an act of the insur-
ance company or any of its officers, agents or employees. 
The trial court granted the insurance company's motion to 
dismiss and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed, pointing out 
that the clause in question expressly made the landlords 
responsible for their own negligent acts. 
Unlike the landlords in the Barrus case, Union 
Pacific is not seeking indemnification under a contract where 
it is expressly responsible for its own negligence. Moreover, 
due to the provisions of the FELA, Union Pacific, unlike the 
landlords, was liable to the injured person even though its 
negligence, if any, was merely derivative rather than active 
in a traditional common law sense. Consequently, it seems 
clear that the Barrus case actually supports Union Pacific's 
position. 
In the Howe Rents case, supra, a bailor sued a 
bailee for damages to a cement mixer which allegedly had been 
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negligently attached to the bailee's truck by the bailer. 
The cement mixer came loose and overturned. The bailer sued 
for damages under a portion of the contract of bailment which 
rendered the bailee liable for all damage to equipment 
regardless of cause. The trial court refused to allow the 
defendant to prove that the accident was caused by the negli-
gent acts of the bailer. This court reversed with instructions 
to allow the defendant to assert the bailor's negligence as 
a defense. 
In the instant case, there is no evidence of negli-
gence on Union Pacific's part. Even assuming that Mr. Tua'one's 
failure to detect the spool of cable prior to the accident 
constituted negligence, which negligence is expressly denied, 
such negligence would at best be passive rather than active, 
a distinction recognized by the court in Barrus, which case 
was heavily relied upon by the court in Howe Rents. More-
over, Intermountain Farmers failed to perform a duty which 
it had specifically covenanted to perform, i.e., keep an area 
eight feet six inches wide from the center line of the track 
free of any obstacles or other material, which failure directly 
and proximately caused Mr. Richins' injuries. Furthermore, 
the contract in the instant case clearly, unequivocally, and 
in absolute terms spells out Intermountain Farmers' obliga-
tion if it fails to comply with the covenant. Together, 
Sections 11 and 8 simply state that if Intermountain Farmers 
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allows anything to get within eight feet six inches of the 
center of the track and someone is hurt as a result thereof, 
Intermountain Farmers is solely responsible therefor. 
It must be emphasized that in each of the fore-
going cases relied upon by Intermountain Farmers the negli-
gence of the indernnitee was either admitted or conclusively 
established. Furthermore, none of the foregoing cases 
involves the special relationship which exists between an 
interstate railroad and its employees under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act nor do any of them involve a con-
tract between such a railroad and an industry whereby the 
railroad sought to protect itself from liability which may 
accrue to it while employees are performing work on land 
which is under the domination and control of the industry. 
The relationship between a railroad and its employees under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act is unique. The threshold 
of negligence which an employee must establish in order to 
recover is extremely low and is quite different from the 
normal threshold of negligence which prevails at common law. 
Moreover, the Federal Employers' Liability Act provides for 
pure comparative negligence--a situation which exists in 
very few other areas of the law. Finally, and probably most 
significant, none of the cases cited by Intermountain Farmers 
distinguishes between the concept of liability for breach of 
covenant as opposed to liability for tort. For all of these 
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reasons, the Utah cases relied upon by Intermountain Farmers 
are completely inappropriate. 
Intermountain Farmers cites ~ ~ortion of 41 Am. Jur. 
2d Indemnity § 15 on pages 21-22 of its brief on appeal; how-
ever, the portion of said section which pertains to this 
lawsuit and which was omitted by Intermountain Farmers in 
its brief further provides as follows: 
It has been said that the general 
rule is not necessarily designed to 
frustrate coverage of the indemnity 
clause as against losses partially 
attributable to negligence of the 
indemnitee; rather, the rule is 
commonly stated in support of con-
clusions against coverage in cases 
where the precise nature of the 
relationship between the indemnitee's 
negligence and the particular loss 
or claim is such as to negate any 
intent that the parties designed 
to cover it by their agreement of 
indemnification. 41 Am. Jur. 2d 
Indemnitv § 15, pages 700-01. 
Furthermore, Intermountain Farmers cites 19 A.L.R. 3d 936 on 
page 27 of its brief on appeal but fails to note the following 
qualifying language appearing at the beginning of the annota-
tion at 19 A.L.R. 3d 930: 
Excluded from this annotation 
are those cases in which indemnity 
or contribution is sought upon the 
basis of an express contract providing 
for indemnity or contribution between 
the joint tortfeasors. 
Finally, Intermountain Farmers quotes extensively 
from Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans Const. co., 
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208 N.E.2d 573 (Ill. 1965), an implied indemnity case which 
does not address the concept of contractual indemnity at all. 
The same infirmity applies to the case of Union Stock Yds. 
Co. v. Chicago &c. R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905), cited in 
the Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry· Co. case. Consequently, 
the legal principles and the holdings of the Chicago & Illinois 
Midland Ry. Co. case and the Union Stock Yds. co. case have 
absolutely no application to the trial court's decision in 
the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no factual or legal basis whatsoever upon 
which to sustain a claim that Union Pacific, its agents or 
employees were in any manner negligent or that such negligence 
caused Mr. Richins' injuries. Even if Union Pacific were 
in fact negligent in some manner, which Union Pacific expressly 
denies, the trial court correctly ruled that "the negligence 
of either party is not an issue nor a necessary element to 
the conclusion of this action" because Intermountain Farmers' 
liability is clearly founded upon breach of covenant rather 
than tort liability. 
The language of the lease agreement prohibited 
any obstruction within the clearance zone regardless of 
negligence on the part of either party. Since the spool of 
cable which caused Mr. Richins' injuries was owned by Inter-
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mountain Farmers and was located within the area expressly 
prohibited by Section 8 of the subject agreement. Mr. Richins' 
injuries were the direct result of Intermountain Farmers' 
breach of the close clearance covenant. Section 8 of the 
agreement imposed an absolute responsibility upon Intermoun-
tain Farmers to keep the specified clearance zone free from 
obstruction regardless of the identity of the person(s) 
responsible for placing, piling, storing, stacking or main-
taining the obstruction. Moreover, none of the pertinent 
provisions of the lease (Sections 1, 5, 8, and 11) mentions 
the words "negligence" or "fault" but, rather, imposes lia-
bility upon Intermountain Farmers for the breach of any 
covenant, regardless of the question of negligence. 
Union Pacific's liability to Mr. Richins arose 
solely by virtue of its nondelegable duty to provide a safe 
place to work under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
45 U.S.C.A. § 51, et seq., which vicariously imputed Inter-
mountain Farmers' negligence to it. Since Union Pacific's 
negligence in this regard was derivative or, at most, 
passive in character, it is, under the cases and authorities 
discussed above, clearly entitled to recover full indemni-
fication from Intermountain Farmers. 
Finally, the cases and authorities cited by Inter-
mountain Farmers are not in point and involve factual situa-
tions which are vastly different from the instant case. 
-32-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Intermountain Farmers has not cited one case involving a 
suit by a railroad against an industry for contractual 
indemnification for damages paid to an employee under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act in support of its position. 
To the contrary, the overwhelming weight of authority in 
such situations completely supports the trial court's deci-
sion. 
Based upon the foregoing, Union Pacific respect-
fully requests that the decision of the lower court be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of November, 
1976, I served by mailing, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent to F. 
Robert Bayle, Esq., and Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esq., attorneys for 
defendant-appellant, 1105 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101. 
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STEVEN A. GOODSELL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
APPENDIX A 
600 Union Pacific Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-1454 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Bayle and Lauchnor 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~;~~ ~~~;ig~~~~lu~:gk :~i~~ing 
Telephone: 364-3627 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
il'ITERMOUNTAIN FAR!1ERS 
ASSOCIATION, a.corporation, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Civil No. 215754 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties 
hereto, through their respective counsel, that the above case 
be submitted to the Court for ruling without a jury, based upon 
the following stipulated facts: 
1. Union Pacific Railroad Company is now, and has 
been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, operating a rail-
road system in the State of Utah and in surrounding states. 
2. Intermountain Farmers Association is now, and 
has been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
3. On February 6, 1964, plaintiff and its lessor, 
Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, entered into a written 
agreement with defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Subject 
Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit 
"A", and by this reference made a part hereof, that provides in 
general for the leasing of certain property (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Leased Premises"), at Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
for a \·:arehouse, grainery, cold storage, platfor.n, and drivei:·lay 
site. 
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4. Pursuant to an extension rider dated October 9, 
1968, a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B" 
and by this reference made a part hereof, and an addendum, dated 
December 31, 1970, a copy of which is attached hereto, ma·cked 
Exhibit "C", and by chis reference made a part hereof, the 
terms and conditions of the Subject Agreement were in full force 
and effect to and including November 30, 1973. 
5. At approximately 7:00 o'clock p.m., on October 31, 
1972, at a time when the Subject Agreement was in full force 
and effect, and while plaintiff's employees were performing a 
switching operation on the railroad track immediately adjacent 
to the Leased Premises, one Richard V. Richins, conductor in 
charge and an employee of plaintiff, sustained severe and 
permanent injuries. Richins claims that he sustained such in-
juries when knocked from the second locomotive unit of a two-
unit diesel engine upon which he was riding by a spool of cable 
owned by Intermountain Farmers, said spool of cable being located 
on the Leased Premises in a position closer than eight (8) feet 
six (6) inches to the center line of the nearest track of the 
plaintiff. 
6. At the time Richins sns tained said injuries, 
plaintiff was engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce; 
Richins was employed by plaintiff in such commerce; and Richins' 
said injuries occurred in the scope and course of his employment 
for plaintiff. 
7. At the time Richins sustained his injuries, it 
was dark and it had just recently stopped snowing. There was 
some snow on the ground, as evidenced by the photographs secured 
on the morning following the accident and attached hereto as 
Exhibits ttnu, 11E11 , 11F11 , 11 G", "H" and 11 1", and by this reference 
made a part hereof. In addition, attached hereto as Exhibit "J", 
and by this reference made a part hereof, is a copy of a Local 
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Climatological Data Report showing weather conditions and pre-
cipitation levels recorded at the Salt Lake International Air-
port during the month of October 1972. The scene of the 
accident is approximately 18 to 20 miles from said weather 
reporting station in a southeasterly direction. 
8. The train in question, consisting of two locomo-
tive units, ~velve loaded cars, ~ency empty cars, and a caboose, 
departed Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 6:00 o'clock 
p.m., on October 31, 1972, en route to Provo, Utah. 
9. The train arrived at Intermountain Farmers Asso-
ciation's facility at Draper, Utah, shortly before 7:00 o'clock 
p.m., and was stopped on the main line track adjacent to defen-
dant's facility headed generally in an eastbound compass direc-
tion. 
10. Immediately to the north of the Leased Premises, 
were three sets of railroad tracks as shown in the print marked 
Exhibit "K", and by this reference made a part hereof. The 
trackage immediately north of defendant's facility is identified 
as the "Poultry Track", the center track is identified as the 
"Main Line Track", and the track to the north of the Leased 
Premises i~ identified as the "Passing Track". The area north 
of defendant's facility and north of where the tracks are located 
is fenced by the land owner on the north, said fence running 
east and west. See three photographs taken September 26, 1975, 
and marked Exhibit "Q", attached hereto, and by this reference 
Qade a part hereof. The area north of the fence referred to as 
depicted in these photographs, is not owned by or leased by 
Intermountain Farmers. 
11. The ~o locomotive units (3645-A and 137-B) were 
detached from the balance of the train remaining on the main 
line trackage, pulled forward beyond the switch into the poul-
try track, and subsequently backed in a westerly direction along 
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the poultry track adjacent to the lntermountain Farmers Associa-
tion's facility. 
12. At the time of this backward movement along the 
poultry track, the engineer, an employee of plaintiff, was 
operating the ~vo locomotive units from the east locomotive 
(3645-A) seated at the controls located on the south side of 
the east locomotive cab. 
13. The brakeman, Levi Ki Tua' one, an employee of 
plaintiff, was riding the west locomotive (137-B), on the south-
west corner thereof. He was a student brakeman and this was 
his third road trip out of the yard. 
14. The lead or west locomotive unit identified as 
137-B which entered the poultry track first had two headlights 
operating at the time to illuminate the track and right of way. 
These headlights, located one above the other on the horizontal 
center line of the locomotive, approximately 12 feet 5 inches 
above the rail, were seven inches in diameter and produced a 
total beam candle power of 600,000 units. The brakeman claims 
there was plenty of light to see the tracks as they were back-
ing. He said he bad no trouble seeing where he was going. 
(Deposition of Tua'one, pages 9 and 34). 
15. The purpose of the westerly inbound movement 
was to pick up two empty but separated boxcars located on the 
poultry track serving the defendant. These Dvo boxcars 
(UP 165227 and LN 12470) et the time of the inbound move were 
located over the bare spots in the snow depicted in Exhibit "D". 
16. During the westerly inbound move on the poultry 
track, the southwest steps of unit 137-B upon which the brake-
man was riding at the time, must have passed by or over the 
spool of cable; however, the brakeman claims he did not observe 
the spool of cable. He says he was maintaining a lookout and 
did not see any obstruction or obstacle to the movement of che 
train. 
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17. Plaintiff's employees claici they were performing 
their duties for the railro2d company in the customary and 
routine manner under the circumstances. The railroad company 
procedure is such that before backing a train, the track must 
be free from obstruction to train movement and the track must 
either be seen during the movement or known to be clear. (Richins' 
Deposition, page 53). 
18. During the west bound movement on the poultry 
track, Conductor Richins, who had been riding the caboose from 
Salt Lake City to Draper, had dismounted from the caboose and 
had walked easterly between the main line track and the poultry 
track to assist in the switching operation being conducted on 
the poultry track. (Second Deposition of Richins, pages 22 and 
23). 
19. Mr. Richins stated in his deposition, 
"Q. Did you know when you left the yard to go south that 
he was a new man A. Yes. 
Q. a new brakeman? A. Yes. This is why 
I was going up to help. 
Q. Had he been an experienced brakeman would you have left 
the caboose that night? A. I'd have left the 
caboose but chances are I wouldn't have concentrated so 
much on the work that was at hand. I would have --
there are other duties that I have that I could have 
been doing. 
Q. You would have allowed him -- if he had been an 
experienced brake.,,an you would have allowed him to do 
the connecting himsel~? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You wouldn't have assisted in doing that necessarily 
unless he asked? A. Unless I happened 
to be there. If I had arrived there at a time when I 
could assist I'd assist, but in insp~cting the crain, 
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when I walk up, instead of concentrating so much on 
getting up there helping him, I would have spent 
more time looking the train over." (Second Deposition 
of Richins, pages 22 and 23). 
20. After che two locor.'otives reached the first car 
on the poultry track, identified as UP 165227, the brakeman 
made the connection between the two locomotives and said car. 
21. Conductor Richins, who by this time had arrived 
at the west car on the poultry track (LN 12470), transmitted 
instructions to the engineer by walkie-talkie radio which he 
was carrying to facilitate the coupling be~{een UP 165227 and 
LN 12470. The track where the switching was being conducted 
was curved in such a manner that the engineer could not see to 
the rear of the train and visually receive signals from the 
brakeman or conductor, so the conductor was transmitting signals 
by radio in the customary and authorized manner under such 
circumstances. 
22. After the coupling had been completed and the 
brake airlines charged, Conductor Richins advised the engineer 
by walkie-talkie radio to commence the eastbound movement in 
order to return to the main line trackage and the balance of 
the train. 
23. As the movement commenced, Conductor Richins and 
the brakeman simultaneously stepped aboard the southwest corner 
of trailing locomotive 137-B. Richins testified that he would 
not have mounted the train as it moved out to the main line buc 
would have walked over to the caboose if it hadn't been for the 
rubbish, slimy dust, bran dust or grain on the ground in the 
area. (See Richins' deposition, page 28, lines 1-5; page 3L, 
lines 6-11; page 35, lines 5-13, 22-25; and page 36, lines 1-2). 
24. The brakeman claims he had both of his feet 
located on the botto~ step of trailing loco~otive 137-B, as 
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depicted in the photograph marked Exhibit "L", and Conductor 
Richins claims he had his right foot on the bottom step and 
left foot on the foot board, as depicted in said Exhibit "L". 
Richins said both men were crowding onto the same area but that 
such a situation was not abnormal or unusual with a student 
brakeman. (Second Deposition of Richins, page 18). 
25. After the movement had obtained the speed of 
approximately three to five miles per hour and had moved approxi-
mately two boxcar lengths, Conductor Richins claims he was 
knocked off the moving train by the spool of cable owned by the 
defendant and depicted in Exhibits "E.", "F", "G", "H", and "I", 
precipitating the injuries sustained. 
26. At the time of the accident, Conductor Richins 
was riding the train movement on the south side of the poultry 
track next to the Intermountain Farmers Association's facility, 
under lease to the defendant. The spool of one-half inch steel 
cable, as depicted in the photographs marked Exhibits "E", "F", 
"G", "H", and "!", at the time of the accident was located with-
in eight (8) feet six (6) inches from the center line of the 
poultry track immediately adjacent to the Leased Premises. 
27. Neither plaintiff nor any of its employees, 
agents, servants, etc., claims to have been aware of or to have 
observed the subject spool of cable at anytime prior to the 
accident. 
28. After the accident, the spool of cable owned by 
defendant was observed to be located approximately one foot south 
of the south rail of the poultry track in the location shown in 
the photographs marked Exhibits "E", "Frr, "G", "H", and "I". 
The distance between the rails of the poultry track was four (4) 
feet eight and one-half (8~) inches. 
29. Defendant claims to have last seen the spool of 
cable located right next to its building immediately south of 
the poultry track where the accident occurred. At about 11:00 
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o'cloc~ a.m. on the day prior to the accident, an employee of 
defendant, Robert W. Turley, its plant ~anager, made an inspec-
tion of the building, by walking along the sa~e. Such inspec-
tions were made approximacely once a wee~<. (Turley deposition, 
pages 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 36 and 37). Turley saw no spool 
of cable in the track area, nor had he ever seen this spool 
prior to the accident. (Turley Deposition, pages 14, 15 and 37). 
30. Defendant's employees disclaim having any know-
lege as to how the spool of cable got to its location at or 
near the trac~ on the night of the accident. The night of the 
accident in question was Halloween night. 
31. The dimensions of the spool were approximately 
one (1) foot in height by two (2) feet four (4) inches in length. 
Attached to the spool was some one-half inch (~) steel cable. 
The defendant claims it never used the spool and cable. 
32. By letter, dated December 15, 1972, plaintiff 
advised defendant in writing of the subject accident, expressed 
the opinion that legal action was apparent, and provided defen-
dant full opportunity to defend or participate in the disposi-. 
tion thereof. (A copy of said letter, marked Exhibit "M" is 
attached hereto). 
33. On or about January 29, 1973, said Richard V. 
Richins filed an action alleging negligent conduct against the 
Railroad, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, entitled "Richard V. Richins vs. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company", identified as Ci·Jil Number 210084, 
de~anding judgment for injuries sustained in the above-described 
accident in the sum of $750,000.00; such action was brought 
under and by virtue of the provisions of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Section 51, et seq. 
34. On February 21, 1973, the Railroad notified 
Inter~ountain Farme~s in writing of the pend2ncy of such action 
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and again provided Intermountain Farmers full opportunity to 
defend the Railroad or participate in the defense against 
Richins' lawsuit. A copy of said notification is attached here-
to marked Exhibit "N", and by this reference made a part hereof. 
By letter, dated March 22, 1973, Intermountain Farmers declined 
to accept tender of the case. 
35. By a hand-delivered letter, dated and delivered 
October 24, 1973, the Railroad advised Intermountain Farmers 
that, following extensive settlement negotiations with Richard V. 
Richins' legal counsel, the Railroad had agreed to compromise 
Mr. Richins' case for $162,500.00. In said letter, the Railroad 
requested that Intermountain Farmers be prepared to tender the 
compromise payment of $162,500.00 to Mr. Richins at the settle-
ment conference scheduled for October 31, 1973. A copy of said 
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "O", and by this reference 
made a part hereof. 
36. On October 31, 1973, the Railroad, by way of 
compromise and in order to settle Mr. Richins' action and 
secure a release, paid to said Richard V. Richins the sum of 
$162,500.00. Intermountain Farmers' name was included in the 
Release, but not by its request. A copy of said Release is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "P", and by this reference made a 
part hereof. 
37. At all times mentioned herein, Intermountain 
Farmers rejected the tender of defense of the claim and suit 
brought by Mr. Richins and rejected any and all offers of the 
Railroad to enter into negotiations and/or settlement of 
Richins 1 suit. 
38. On or about November 15, 1973, the Railroad 
instituted this action to recover from the Interraountain 
Farmers said $162,500.00, together with defense costs and 
expenses in the sum of $1,195.00, reasonable attorneys' fees 
in the sum of $1,840.00, and decositions expenses of $97.50, 
for a total sum of $165,632.50. 
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39. Under the ?rovisions of the Feder2l Employers' 
Liability Act herein referred to, a jury issue was presented 
as to whether or n~t the Railroad was negligent and ~ould have 
been held legally liable to Richard V. Richins for the injuries 
he sustained as described above, and the Railrcad could have 
been held legally liable by a jury or court for such injuries 
sustained. 
40. It is agreed by the parties that the settlement 
made by the Railroad with Conductor Richins in his lawsuit 
under the provisions of said Federal Employers' Liability Act 
is deemed reasonable in all respects, including all costs and 
attorneys' fees. 
41. The respective parties further stipulate that all 
depositions taken in this action may be published and used by 
the Court for the purpose of making its decision herein. 
GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIHS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES 
A. Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to indemnifica-
tion under one or more of the following theories: 
1. Full indemnity under either contractural indemnity 
and/or implied indemnity; 
2. Contribution under Section 78-27-39, U.C.A, 1953 
(Supp. 1973); 
3. Application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
B. Defendant contends: 
1. There is no indemnity, either contractural or 
implied, from defendant to plaintiff for the 
injuries to Richins; 
2. At the ci~e of the accident and inju=ies to 
Richins, ~here was no right of contribution 
be~.Jee'1. joint tort feasors. If defe!"l.dant 
herein is deter~ined to be a tore fe~sor, 
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which it denies, Title 78-27-39, U.C.A 1953, 
(Supp. 1973) has no application as it was 
passed by the Legislature and became law 
subsequent to the accident involving 
Richins; 
3. Denies the application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. 
The foregoing Stipulation is hereby agreed to and 
entered into this ~ day of April, 1976. 
>@2:1%f.,,., 
/"~'~ 
_,/ Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/ Union Pacific Railroad Company 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR 
'"'f? l' By -f 1,-1-.--',1 ( \._,.._... _,,C....c_ 
F. Robert Bayle-'! 
Attorneys forJJifendant 
Intermountain Farmers Association 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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